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economists look for the factors that drive the dynamics of the yield curve. To shed light on both
issues, we present an empirical macro-finance model that combines a no-arbitrage affine term
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trace the effects of these shocks on the prices of bonds of different maturities. Compared to a
standard VAR, this approach has the advantage of incorporating the information embedded in a large
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ability to capture risk preferences and expectations. Our results suggest that (i) government deficits
affect long term interest rates: a one percentage point increase in the deficit to GDP ratio, lasting for
3 years, will eventually increase the 10-year rate by 40--50 basis points; (ii) this increase is partly due
to higher expected spot rates, and partly due to higher risk premia on long term bonds; and (iii) the
fiscal policy shocks account for up to 12% of the variance of forecast errors in bond yields.
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Empirical macroeconomic research has not been able to establish if and how govern-
ment deﬁcits aﬀect interest rates (Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)). Yet, the issue is of
crucial importance for policy making and for academic research. One reason for this
lack of success is that macroeconomists have not fully incorporated long term inter-
est rates into their empirical models. Instead, the literature has mainly relied upon
simple least-squares estimates (see Gale and Orszag (2003) and Engen and Hubbard
(2004) for surveys of the existing literature). Recently, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2002) and Laubach (2003) have presented clever regressions that suggest that deﬁcits
matter, and Evans and Marshall (2002) have studied the response of the yield curve
to a range of macroeconomic shocks, identiﬁed separately. The common feature of
these papers is that they do not model the kernel that prices long term bonds, and,
therefore, do not provide an explicit decomposition of long rate changes into expected
short rates and risk premia.
On the other hand, recent theoretical and empirical research in ﬁnance has led
to a better understanding of the dynamic properties of the term structure of interest
rates: The models are parsimonious, ﬁnancially coherent, and are able to capture
some important stylized facts. (see Dai and Singleton (2003) for a recent survey of
this literature). Most existing models, however, are based on unobserved or latent
risk factors, which are not easy to interpret. The next step, currently under way,
(see, e.g., Piazzesi (2003), Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Rudebusch and Wu (2003), and
H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2003)) is to draw explicit connections between latent
risk factors that drive the term structure dynamics and observed macro-economic
variables characterizing the state of the economy.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic term structure model that emphasizes the
role of ﬁscal policy. We start by estimating an aﬃne model that combines observable
macroeconomic variables with one latent factor. We then identify ﬁscal policy shocks
using the restrictions proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Finally, we examine
the impact of policy shocks on the economic system and the yield curve.
Our work contributes to both the macroeconomic and empirical ﬁnance literature
2in three ways. First, we introduce a ﬁscal policy variable into a no-arbitrage dynamic
term structure model. It has been known at least since Taylor (1993) that there is
enough information in inﬂation and the output gap to account for changes in the
short term interest rate. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) conﬁrm this ﬁnding, and also show
that these same macroeconomic factors do not capture the dynamics of long term
rates very well. We go some way toward addressing this issue by showing that ﬁscal
policy can account for some (but not all) of the unexplained long rate dynamics.
Second, we argue that bond pricing equations provide useful over-identifying re-
strictions to empirical macroeconomic models. The number of variables one can
include in a VAR is limited, but how can we be sure that a small state space is
actually able to capture technology, preferences and the relevant information sets of
economic agents? We show how one can use bond prices to address this key issue.
Bond prices are observable and bond returns are predictable (see Cochrane and Pi-
azzesi (2004) for some recent results). Empirical models should be able to price bonds
and predict returns. A failure to do so means that the model does not capture risk
aversion, or expectations, or both. These ideas guide our preliminary analysis, and
in particular our choice of the variables to be included in the state space. We then
conduct a maximum likelihood estimation of the model that incorporate all of the
over-identifying restrictions oﬀered by bond prices and returns. We ﬁnd that a model
with four observable macroeconomic variables (federal funds rate, inﬂation, deﬁcit,
real activity) and one latent factor can price bonds, capture return predictability and
explain the deviations from the expectations hypothesis.
Third, we show that ﬁscal policy matters for interest rates. Research in ﬁnance has
focused on ﬁnding a kernel that can price various bonds, but it has not tried to identify
the economic shocks driving the kernel. To do so, one must impose theoretically
motivated restrictions on the covariance matrix of reduced form shocks. We use an
identiﬁcation strategy similar to the one in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to compute
ﬁscal policy shocks. We ﬁnd that a ﬁscal shock that increases the deﬁcit to GDP
ratio by 1% leads to 40-50 basis points increase in the 10 year interest rate.
When we decompose this increase into risk premia and expected future short
rates, we ﬁnd that the risk premia explain one third to one half of the increase in
3long term interest rates. This ﬁnding sheds new light on the conﬂicting results re-
ported in Gale and Orszag (2003) and Engen and Hubbard (2004), because previous
macroeconomic research has systematically neglected risk premia. Finally, we decom-
pose deﬁcit changes into public spending and taxes, and we ﬁnd that taxes matter
independently from spending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the bond pricing
model. In, Section 2, we conduct a preliminary analysis of the data using a set of
excess returns and yield regressions, and we argue that these regressions can help us
choose the state space of the model. Section 3 presents the estimation of the macro-
ﬁnance model by maximum likelihood. Section 4 discusses identiﬁcation and presents
the impulse responses to ﬁscal policy shocks.
1 The Aﬃne Pricing Model
We begin with a description of the main features of the discrete-time dynamic term
structure model. Technical details can be found in the appendices. We assume that
the state vector yt follows a Vector Autoregressive process1 of ﬁnite order L+1, yt =
φ0 +
 L+1
l=1 φlyt−l +ut. We defer the discussion of which variables should be included
in the state space to section 2. By expanding the state space to the companion form
Yt = [yt .. yt−L], we can rewrite the state dynamics in the more convenient VAR(1)
form (after normalizing the unconditional mean to 0):
Yt = ΦYt−1 + Ut, (1)
where the shocks Ut = [ut;0] are jointly normally distributed with constant covariance
matrix Ω = E [UtU′
t].














where the vector of market prices of risk is given by
Λt = Ω
−1 (Λ0 + ΛYt), (3)
1The observation interval is arbitrary at this stage, and is quarterly in the empirical implemen-
tation.
4and the short rate (1-quarter) is given by
rt = δ0 + δ
′Yt. (4)
We assume that the government will never default on its nominal obligations.
Real defaults are possible through high inﬂation, however. We believe that these are
sensible assumptions for the US in the post-war period. By deﬁnition of the pricing












In an aﬃne setup, one can easily show that bond prices are given by
P
n
t = exp(−An − B
′
nYt), (5)
where An and Bn solve recursive equations







Bn = δ + (Φ − Λ)
′ Bn−1.
(6)
with initial conditions A0 = B0 = 0. Clearly, A1 = δ0, and B1 = δ.
1.1 Relation to Existing Work on the Term Structure
Equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) constitute a full-ﬂedged term structure model, which
belongs to the class of aﬃne term structure models (see, e.g., Duﬃe and Kan (1996),
Dai and Singleton (2000), Dai and Singleton (2002), and Duﬀee (2002)). In section 2,
we will argue that in order to give a reasonable description of both the economic
environment and the term structure dynamics, the state vector yt should include the
federal fund rate (ft), the logarithm of spending over taxes (dt), the log growth rate
of the GDP deﬂator (πt), the help wanted index (ht) 2, and a latent variable.
Existing works that are most closely related to our model are Ang and Piazzesi
(2003), Rudebusch and Wu (2003), and H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2003). Ang
and Piazzesi (2003) use a no-arbitrage VAR where the maintained assumption is
2This is an index of help wanted advertising in newspapers, available on FRED R   II (Federal
Reserve Economic Data).
5that latent factors (which presumably include monetary and ﬁscal policies) do not
aﬀect output or inﬂation. Their model is most useful to understand how much of the
dynamics of the yield curve can be accounted for by inﬂation and real activity, but
it is not suitable for identifying the eﬀects of monetary and ﬁscal policies.
In contrast, Rudebusch and Wu (2003) and H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2003)
start from a simple textbook model of the macro-economy, with a price setting equa-
tion for ﬁrms, and a linearized Euler equation for consumption and output. We do
not follow this strategy, for two reasons. First, while the price setting equation that
governs the inﬂation process in the textbook model appears to be quite reasonable
(see, e.g., Gali and Gertler (1999)), the Euler equation, that supposedly links aggre-
gate dynamics to asset prices suﬀers from known failures (the most well-known being
the equity premium puzzle or the risk-free rate puzzle). Indeed, for the purpose of
pricing bonds, Rudebusch and Wu (2003) and H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2003)
posit a reduced-form pricing kernel on top of the marginal rate of substitution under-
lying the Euler equation. Second, to examine the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks on the
term structure of interest rates, it would be necessary to introduce the ﬁscal variables
into either the pricing equation, or the aggregate demand equation, or both. There
is hardly any consensus in the macro literature on how this should be achieved.
2 Choosing the State Space
We now turn to the choice of the variables to be included in the state space. As
one can see from equation (5), the aﬃne model predicts linear relations between the
components of the state space and bond yields. As it turns out, the same is true for
bond returns. One can therefore use simple OLS regressions to assess the performance
of diﬀerent candidate variables for the state space.
We focus on two sets of linear regressions: yield regressions that relate changes in
the yield levels to (contemporaneous) changes in the state vector; and excess return
regressions that relate the predictable component of bond returns to the current
state of the economy. The idea here is simply that, if the state space is correctly
speciﬁed, it should be able to explain bond prices as well as bond returns through
6the reduced-form bond pricing equations implied by the model. If the proposed state
space fails this test, there is no point going further. If the proposed state space passes
the test, then it makes sense to estimate a term structure model that imposes cross-
sectional restrictions (which arise from the no-arbitrage assumption) on the regression
coeﬃcients. The implication of such restrictions will be discussed following the results
from the unrestricted OLS regressions.
We use quarterly time-series observations of the federal funds rate, the log spend-
ing to taxes ratio3, the quarterly growth rate of the GDP deﬂator, the change in the
help wanted index, and zero-coupon bond yields with maturities ranging from 1 to 40
quarters. Yield data are constructed by extending the Fama-Bliss smoothed data set
to the recent quarters. The macro-variables are obtained from the National Income
and Product Accounts. The sample period is from the ﬁrst quarter of 1970 to the
third quarter of 2003 and the summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
2.1 Yields regressions












t is the yield at time t on a zero-coupon Treasury with remaining maturity
n, and an ≡ An/n and bn ≡ Bn/n.
Table 2 presents the yields regressions (7) estimated by OLS independently for
each maturity n. The ﬁrst four regressions do not include the 2-year rate, while the
last one does. There are three main ﬁndings. First, the R2 are high. Second, the
ﬁscal variables become more relevant as maturity increases, while the federal fund
rate, help and inﬂation become relatively less important. Not including the deﬁcit
reduces the R2 by more than 10 percentage points for the 10-year rate. Looking at
the fourth column, one cannot reject the hypothesis that taxes and spending enter
with opposite coeﬃcients of similar magnitude. The last regression includes also the
3The deﬁnition for spending and taxes follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) (see their appendix
for details). Spending is the purchase of goods and services by federal, state and local governments.
Taxes are taxes minus transfers.
7two year rate. Obviously, the 2-year rate is correlated with the 10-year rate, but
note that the deﬁcit remains very signiﬁcant. Finally, we have introduced the debt to
GDP ratio in our regressions, and we have found it to be systematically insigniﬁcant4.
This may or may not be surprising, depending on which model one has in mind (see
Mankiw (2000) for a discussion).
2.2 Excess return regressions
Alternatively, we can examine holding-period returns on bonds of various maturities.
By deﬁnition, the holding-period return on an n-period zero-coupon bond for τ period,
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= αn + β
′
nYt,
where αn = An − An−τ − Aτ, and βn = B′
n − B′
τ − B′
n−τΦτ. Using the recursion for
Bn, the slope coeﬃcients can be computed explicitly and are given by
β
′
n = Bn−τ [(Φ − Λ)
τ − Φ
τ].
Clearly, the risk premium is constant for all n and τ if and only if Λ vanishes. Table
3 presents the excess return regressions.5 The observable state space can predict 20%
of the excess returns on 5-year bonds, slightly more on 2-year bonds, and slightly less
on 10-year bonds. When we add the 2-year rate to the state space, we can account
for more than 36% of excess returns. As a benchmark, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2004)
report predictability of around 40% using all the forward rates (although their study
is restricted to maturities of ﬁve years or less).
The help wanted index is clearly the preferred choice for pricing bonds. Columns
4 and 5 show that neither the growth rate of GDP, nor the growth rate of non-durable
4If one introduces additional lags, the data chooses to recreate the deﬁcit by putting coeﬃcients
of similar magnitudes and opposite signs on the log of debt and its lag.
5Again, these are “unrestricted” regressions in the sense that cross-sectional restrictions on αn
and βn for diﬀerent n are ignored.
8consumption, are statistically signiﬁcant. Note however that one qualitative feature
appears very robust: excess returns on long term bonds go down when the state
of the economy improves. This is consistent with the view that risk aversion varies
over time in a counter-cyclical fashion. The regressions simply indicate that the help
wanted index is a better proxy for this time varying risk aversion. The regressions
also suggest that excess returns are high when real interest rates are high. Finally,
and as expected, the last column shows that the slope between the two-year rate and
the federal funds rate predicts excess returns.
2.3 Taking stock
We draw two main conclusion from this exercise. First, the observable variables that
we propose can potentially account for a large fraction of the dynamics of interest
rates. Second, we need a latent factor to capture some movements in the levels and
excess returns of long term bonds. The fact that the two-year rate is very useful in
predicting excess returns means that there is extra information in the current yield
curve about agents’ expectations and/or risk aversion. A formal economic interpre-
tation of the latent variable is beyond the scope of this paper. For our purpose,
it suﬃces to say that economic agents presumably form their expectations using a
larger information set than by simply looking at past values of inﬂation, output and
the federal funds rate. These expectations are then embedded in the term structure,
and, therefore, in our latent variable. Other factors that can aﬀect the supply and
demand of long term bonds, but are not adequately captured by the macro-economic
variables included here, range from “liquidity preference” to central bank intervention
in the currency market.6
The yields and returns regressions that we have presented do not enforce the
restrictions (on the time-series behavior of yields or returns of individual bonds)
implied by our pricing model. The unrestricted coeﬃcients, however, can be used
to construct restricted estimates of the parameters of interest. Speciﬁcally, since the
6For an example, the rally of the 10-year market in the ﬁrst half of 2004 was strongly inﬂuenced
by the dollar purchase by Asian central banks, which increased the demand for long-term U.S.
Treasuries as the banks’ dollar reserve was cycled into the Treasury markets.
9slope coeﬃcients from the yield regressions must satisfy the recursions (6), and since
the mean reversion matrix Φ can be estimated directly by OLS, the state-dependent
portion of the market price of risk can be estimated by choosing Λ = Λyield that gives
the best cross-sectional ﬁt of the unrestricted yields coeﬃcients. Alternatively, since
the excess returns are proportional to the market prices of risk, we can obtain another
estimate, Λreturn, by regressing the coeﬃcients from the excess return regressions
on the coeﬃcients from the yield regressions. Λyield and Λreturn emphasize diﬀerent
aspects of the data. If the model is correctly speciﬁed, the two estimates should be
similar. Indeed, an important reason why we ﬁnd it necessary to include a latent
variable in the state space is that Λyield and Λreturn are much closer when the latent
variable (proxied by the two-year rate in our OLS analysis) is present than when it
is absent. As a practical matter, when Λyield and Λreturn are suﬃciently close, we can
use either one of the estimates as starting value for the MLE, and the model has a
good chance of explaining the violation of the expectations puzzle. Otherwise, the
model tends to be bimodal in the sense that there are (at least) two local optima that
emphasize diﬀerent aspects of the model ﬁt (yield levels versus returns).
3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Having settled on a state space, we will now estimate the model using maximum
likelihood based on the Kalman Filter. Details on the construction of the Kalman
Filter and the likelihood are presented in the appendices.
At a technical level, the maximum likelihood approach allows us to replace the
bond yield in the OLS analysis by a latent variable in order to impose no-arbitrage
restrictions in a proper and natural manner. It also allows us to compute asymptotic
standard errors for the parameter estimates based on standard inference procedures.
At a substantive level, the maximum likelihood approach allows the model to achieve
the best trade-oﬀ between the time-series properties of the state variables and the
cross-sectional behavior of bond yields and returns. This is critically important for
our purpose because, as we will elaborate in the next section, ﬁscal policies aﬀect
the term structure through both expectations and risk premia. In order to identify
10the two eﬀects separately, we do not wish to skew the model toward one channel at
the expense of another through arbitrary choices of moment conditions and weighting
schemes. It is worth pointing out that, by design, the MLE estimation is independent
of the structural restrictions needed to identify the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks.
Based on the analysis presented in section 3, we choose the state space yt =
(ft,dt,πt,ht,qt), where ft is the federal funds rate, dt is (one tenth of ) log of spending
over taxes, πt is realized inﬂation, ht is help wanted index, and qt is latent. We specify
the dynamics of yt as a V AR(2) using an information criterion to select the number
of lags. In addition to the macro variables, we assume that eight bonds (with 1, 2,
4, 8, 16, 20, 30, 40 quarters of maturity) are observed and used in the estimation.7
The measurement errors on these bonds have a multi-variate normal distribution with
zero mean and arbitrary correlation.
The sample period, from 1970:1Q to 2003:3Q, consists of 135 quarters. In each
quarter, we observe 12 variables (8 bonds and 4 observable macro variables), for a
total of 1620 observations. We restrict the short-rate equation and the market price
of risk in such a way that current bond prices depend only upon current values of the
state space, i.e., such that An and Bn load only on yt, not yt−1.8 The parameters of
interest characterize the dynamics of the system (Φ,Ω), the short rate (δ0,δ) and the
market price of risk (Λ0,Λ).9 Given the model parameters and other necessary nor-
malizations10, an unbiased estimate of the latent variable qt can be obtained through
7We allow ft to depend on all the macroeconomic variables as well as the latent factor. This
speciﬁcation accommodates backward and forward looking monetary policy rules, and allows the
monetary authority to react to the information contained in long term bonds.
8This restriction is again motivated by OLS regressions where we have found that past values
of macroeconomic variables did not contain a signiﬁcant amount of information for current yields.
Technically, this is achieved by imposing the restriction that (i) the short rate does not load on the
lagged state variables, and (ii) the dynamics of yt is VAR(1) under the risk-neutral measure. This
reduces the number of free parameters by 30. As noted earlier, the forecast model for yt under the
physical measure is VAR(2).
9The MLE also estimates the covariance matrix of the measurement errors. Intuitively, one of
the observed bond yields identiﬁes the latent factor. The resulting state space identiﬁes the VAR
parameters. The remaining bond yields identify the pricing kernel and the covariance matrix of the
measurement errors through the pricing restrictions and zero-mean restrictions on the measurement
errors.
10The presence of a latent factor means that the model is invariant to certain aﬃne transforma-
tions. We normalize the model by imposing the following restrictions: (i) the loading of the short
rate on the latent factor is 1; and (ii) the latent factor is conditionally uncorrelated with the observed
11the Kalman ﬁlter.11
Table 4 presents the estimated coeﬃcients and Table 5 presents the t-statistics.12
We ﬁnd that many parameters are sharply identiﬁed. For instance, look at the fourth
column of the loadings of the market prices of risk on the current state space. The
point estimate for the (4,4) element 0.705 means that a positive shock to ht increases
Λt and therefore decreases the expected excess returns on long term bonds. This
captures the time varying, counter-cyclical risk aversion of the economy. The t-
statistic for this coeﬃcient is 2.233.
Figure 1 presents the yield loadings bn implied by the MLE estimates of Φ and Λ.
The loadings do not have a structural interpretation because the variables in the sys-
tem are jointly endogenous, and also because we can rotate the model by adding any
linear combination of the observed variables to the latent variable. The shapes of the
loading curves, however, are still informative. As expected from the OLS regressions,
we ﬁnd that the loadings on the deﬁcit increase with maturity. This is an interesting
property since all the observed factors we are aware of tend to display the opposite
pattern when they are embedded in an aﬃne model. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2
shows that the model does a good job at matching the mean and volatility of the yield
curve. In each subplot, we include the sample moment (circles), moment computed
from the model-implied yields (crosses), and the population moment evaluated at the
MLE estimates (solid line) together with one standard-error bands (dashed lines).
For the most part, the sample moments for both observed and model-implied yields
are within one standard error of the population moments. Figure 3 shows that the
observed factors account for 80% to 95% of the variance of interest rates, that the
latent factor explains most of the remaining variance, and that the pricing errors are
small.13
factors. See Dai and Singleton (2000) for a more general discussion of these issues.
11We impose that the eigenvalues of I −
 L+1
j=1 φj lie within the unit circle, so that the state
process is stationary under the physical measure. We also rule out complex eigen-values for the
mean reversion matrix under the risk-neutral measure to avoid oscillating behavior in the yield
loadings.
12In computing the t-statistics, we ﬁxed some of the parameters to their point estimates if their
t-ratios are less than 1. Essentially, these parameters are numerically under-identiﬁed even though
they are identiﬁed in theory.
13By deﬁnition, our model implies that rn
t = an+b′
nyt+errorn
t . The orthogonal part of the latent
12An important test on whether a model can explain the conditional distribution of
the yield curve is to check whether it can explain the violation of the expectations













should be equal to 1. Campbell and Shiller (1991) show, however, that the cn coeﬃ-
cients are negative for all maturities, suggesting that the expectations hypothesis is
violated. For our sample, the slope coeﬃcients cn range from −0.5 to −3, as indicated
by circles in Figure 4. The solid line in the same graphs represents the population
values of the slope coeﬃcients from our model (solid line), which is computed as 1
minus the linear projection coeﬃcient from the expected excess return on the slope
of the yield curve.14 The fact that the Campbell-Shiller coeﬃcients lie within the
predicted standard-error bands (dotted lines) of the population coeﬃcients means
that our model explains the expectations puzzle. For comparison, we also plot the
coeﬃcients (stars) implied by the ﬁltered yields from MLE. The latter are even closer
to their sample counterparts, indicating that the remaining diﬀerence between the
sample coeﬃcients and the population coeﬃcients may be explained by small sample
biases.
We conclude that we have a decent bond pricing model to work with. In particular,
the fact that our model explains the expectations puzzle should allow us to separate
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks on risk premia from their eﬀects on expectations of
future short rates. This does not mean that the structural restrictions that we are
going to impose in the next section are warranted. We are simply going to use an
oﬀ-the-shelf procedure. One can agree or disagree with the identifying restrictions
factor is the residual from projecting the latent factor onto the observed variables. This ordering
gives as much explanatory power as possible to the observed factors.














It follows that the downward bias from 1 (representing the expectations hypothesis) is equal to the
linear projection coeﬃcient from the expected excess return, Et[xrn




13independently from the bond pricing model. However, if one accepts the identifying
restrictions, then, given that our bond pricing model is reasonably successful, one
should take seriously the impulse responses and variance decomposition derived from
the model.
4 Fiscal Policy and Interest Rates
Our goal in this paper is to study the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the term structure
of interest rates. In the previous sections, we have presented an aﬃne model that
seems to capture expectations and risk premia reasonably well. We now turn to the
issue of identifying the policy shocks. Identiﬁcation is the central issue in empirical
macroeconomics, but it has not received the same attention in empirical ﬁnance.
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and without loss of generality, we write the




























Equation (11) emphasizes the fact that not all changes in tax revenues reﬂect gen-
uine policy shocks. When the economy expands, tax revenues increase mechanically.
The problem is that one cannot use macroeconomic data to identify the elasticities
(αg,ατ,γg,γτ). Fortunately, using detailed knowledge of the US tax system, Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) have already calibrated the automatic
responses of spending and taxes to shocks to inﬂation and output. They ﬁnd that:
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) Perotti (2004)
Elasticity αg ατ γg γτ
Calibrated Value 0 2 in 1970, 3 in 2000 -0.5 1.2
Intuitively, spending does not react to news about real activity within the quarter
(αg = 0), and half of it is not directly indexed on inﬂation (γg = −0.5). On the
14other hand, tax revenues increase with real activity (ατ = 2), and also with inﬂation
since the tax system is not inﬂation neutral (γτ = 1.2). Since the deﬁcit is simply








Finally, note that the value of ατ increases steadily over our sample period, as ex-
plained in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
There is an issue in using the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach in our setup
because we do not include GDP in our state space. The tension is the following.
On the one hand, as explained earlier, the help wanted index does a better job at
pricing bonds than GDP growth would. On the other hand, the elasticities (αg,ατ)
apply to GDP, not h. The problem is that innovation to h and to GDP are not





explain 70% of the






We have conducted extensive checks, and found that all of our results are robust
to using one speciﬁcation or the other. We have also estimated a model with GDP
growth. In this model, the performance of the bond pricing model deteriorates, but
the main qualitative and quantitative features of the impulse responses to identiﬁed
ﬁscal shocks remain the same.
Given the values of these elasticities, we can identify the structural shocks εg and
ετ and, therefore, the impulse responses to the ﬁscal shocks. We present the impulse
responses of the state space, and then the implied responses of the short rate and the
10-year rate. We present ﬁrst our baseline speciﬁcation using only the deﬁcit (log of
spending over taxes). We discuss later the extension to a state space with 6 variables,
where we consider spending and taxes separately.
4.1 Responses to Deﬁcit Shocks
Figure 5 presents the responses to the deﬁcit shock. The initial shock is εd =
1%. Because of the automatic stabilizers, the initial increase in deﬁcit is only 0.8%.
15For purely aesthetic reasons, we scale the deﬁcit variable by a factor of 10, so that d = (log(G)−
log(T))/10. Correspondingly, the elasticities to deﬁcit are also scaled by the same factor.
15Inﬂation and real activity increase, while the federal fund rate does not react initially.
Eventually, the federal fund rate increases by substantially more than inﬂation. To get
a sense of the magnitudes involved, remember that spending is roughly 20% of GDP,
and that we have normalized d = 1
10 log(G/T). We are therefore looking at a shock
that would increase spending by 10%, or the deﬁcit to GDP ratio by 2 percentage
points before macroeconomic feedbacks.
Figure 6 presents the response of diﬀerent yields. The response of the 10-year
rate ranges from 5 to 90 basis points. This suggests an maximum elasticity of long
rates to deﬁcits of around 40-50 basis points, which is consistent with the numbers
reported in Gale and Orszag (2003). Figure 6 also shows the response of the 10-year
rate under the expectations hypothesis, i.e. under the assumption that the 10-year
at any point is the average of future short rates over the following 10 years. The
diﬀerence between the actual 10-year rate and the 10-year rate under EH reﬂects
the risk premia on long-term bonds. The risk premium is initially negative before
becoming positive. After 5 years, the risk premium explains between a third and a
half of the increase in long term rates. The initial drop and subsequent increase in the
risk premium come from the dynamics of the state space and the market price of risk.
For instance, deﬁcit spending is expansionary, so ht goes up. As discussed above, this
reduces risk aversion and lowers the premium on long term bonds. Similarly, we see
that the real rate is below its long run mean for at least one year, which contributes
to the low risk premia. Figure 7 shows the impulse response of the 10-year rate
together with its asymptotic standard error bands, while Figure 8 does the same for
the 10-year term premium.
This has several new and important implications. First, it justiﬁes our use of
an explicit term structure model for studying the ﬁscal policy16. Second, it explains
why previous research has reached inconsistent results. More speciﬁcally, researchers
have estimated large coeﬃcients when regressing long rates on current deﬁcits, but
small (and sometimes insigniﬁcant) coeﬃcients when regressing current short rates
16There are no mechanical reasons for the model to imply a time varying risk premia in response
to a ﬁscal shock. Our speciﬁcation of the market price of risk is ﬂexible enough that, in case ﬁscal
shocks did not move risk premia, we would not have found it.
16on current deﬁcits or debt to GDP ratios. Our results suggest that part of the reason
is that high long rates do not necessarily turn into high future short rates.
Figures 9 and 10 show the forecast error variance decomposition of the factors
and selected yields that one can attribute to ﬁscal policy shocks. Fiscal shocks matter
more at longer horizons, and they explain roughly 12% of the variance of interest rates
beyond 5 years.
A potentially important issue that we have not yet discussed is the stability of
our estimates across diﬀerent subsamples. Of particular concern is the change in
monetary policy after the 1981 recession. We have therefore estimated our model on
the post 1981 sample. While some of the estimates change, the main features of the
responses to ﬁscal policy shocks are unaﬀected.
4.2 Responses to Spending and Tax Shocks
While separating government purchases of goods and services from tax revenues and
transfers is important for macroeconomics, it is not the main focus of our paper.
Moreover, existing papers have already investigated the issue (see Blanchard and
Perotti (2002)). Here, we simply wish to present some evidence that we hope will
be informative for future research. Introducing taxes and spending separately is not
straightforward because the two series are non-stationary and need to be either de-
trended, or introduced as growth rates. Growth rates do not have much explanatory
power for yields: the data want the deﬁcit (the diﬀerence between log spending and
taxes), not the change in the deﬁcit, and using additional lags does not solve the
problem. In other words, the model in growth rates is misspeciﬁed. Detrending is
also problematic, however, since it assumes that economic agents know the actual
trends. This does not seem like an ideal assumption17, especially for the purpose of
pricing bonds. For lack of a better alternative, we will nonetheless proceed with lin-
early detrended series. Another issue is that the number of free parameters increases
substantially when we move to a six variable VAR, and the MLE becomes hard to
17The deﬁcit is stationary, has been and is expected to be. But whether the government will choose
to satisfy his budget constraint by adjusting taxes or spending is far from obvious, and certainly
hard to forecast.
17implement.
For all these reasons, the results in this section are not based on MLE. Rather,
we use the simpler, two-steps, “matching moments” approach described at the end of
section 2. We use a state space with 6 variables: (ft,πt,ht) plus detrended spending
(gt) and taxes (τt), and the 2-year interest rate (r8
t). The state space is fully observable
since there is no latent factor, and we can estimate ˆ Φ and ˆ Ω as in a standard VAR.
In the ﬁrst step, we also run 40 yields regressions (7), and 36 one-year excess returns
regressions (8). In the second step, we choose the parameters (δ0,δ,λ0,λ) to minimize
the distance between the coeﬃcients predicted by the recursive equations (6), using ˆ Φ
and ˆ Ω from the VAR, and the estimates from the the 76 yields and returns regressions.
This method is clearly less eﬃcient than MLE, since
 
ˆ Φ, ˆ Ω
 
and (δ0,δ,λ0,λ) are not
jointly estimated, and since the choice of the 2-year interest rate is arbitrary. To
build some conﬁdence, we have checked that it delivers broadly similar results for the
ﬁve-variables model of the previous section. Finally, the policy shocks are constructed
using the elasticities (ατ,γτ,αg,γg) as described above.
Figures 11 and 12 present the impulse responses to spending and taxes sepa-
rately. The initial shocks are always 1% and the initial response of the other ﬁscal
variable (of spending to taxes or taxes to spending) is set to 018. The results look
very similar to the ones presented in Figure 5, but the responses are somewhat larger
for spending shocks. Spending does not seem react to the tax shock. It turns out
that changes in tax policies are not systematically followed by changes in government
spending. We did not impose or expect this result, but we note that it allows us to
talk about the reactions of the economy to changes in the timing of tax revenues,
while keeping the path of spending roughly constant.
Figures 13 and 14 present the impulse responses of diﬀerent nominal yields to
spending and tax shocks. Again, we ﬁnd the initial drop and subsequent increase
in risk premia. The drop is stronger for spending shocks, and the eventual increase
is smaller. The response of the economy to tax shocks, in terms of both prices and
18Changing the ordering changes nothing to our results since the two reduced form shocks are
almost uncorrelated. See Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for similar results and a more detailled
discussion.
18quantities, does not appear consistent with Ricardian equivalence in the short and
medium run. In the long run, everything is neutral by assumption, since our VAR is
stationary in the level of interest rates and detrended taxes and spending.
5 Conclusion
We have presented and estimated an empirical macro-ﬁnance model of the term struc-
ture. Based on bond pricing equations, we have chosen a state space that includes
the federal funds rate, the government deﬁcit, inﬂation, real activity and one latent
factor. The model successfully explains the dynamics of the term structure of in-
terest rates, and deviations from the expectation hypothesis. The model shows that
risk-premia are counter-cyclical and increasing with the level of real rates.
We have found that government deﬁcits increase interest rates, especially long
ones, and that the ﬁscal shocks aﬀect long rates through expectations of future spot
rates as well as risk premia. Following an expansionary ﬁscal shock, the response of
the risk premium is initially small or negative before turning positive after 5 years,
where it accounts for one third to one half of the increase in the 10-year rate. Thus
the initial response of interest rates to ﬁscal shocks is muted, while the long-run
response is ampliﬁed. Our results emphasize that the usual macroeconomic approach
of equating long rates with average future short rates is rejected by the data, and
that not recognizing this fact can lead to inconsistent estimates of the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy. Finally, we have provided some evidence that taxes aﬀect interest rates for
a given path of government spending, which suggests that the Ricardian equivalence
may not hold in the medium run.
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21A Model Speciﬁcation and Parameterization
In this appendix, we collect all of the assumptions and analytical results needed for
a complete description of the dynamic term structure model.
The model is based on L + 1 lags of a N × 1 state vector. Let yt be the state
vector. We assume that




where ut is multi-variate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix ω. It is conve-
nient to re-write the dynamics in terms of the expanded vector: Yt = (yt,yt−1,...,yt−L)′,
which is VAR(1):
























A.1 Pricing Kernel and Risk-Neutral Dynamics
Let δ1 be a N(L + 1) × 1 vector, λ0 be a N × 1 vector, and λ1 be a N × N(L + 1)








rt = δ0 + δ






















where λt = ω−1 (λ0 + λYt). This captures the idea that only the shocks at t+1 is priced. Dependence
of lagged shocks can be normalized away even if allowed.
























t is multi-variate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix Ω under Q.
A.2 Bond Pricing
Under the above assumptions, the price of a zero-coupon bond with maturity n pe-
riods is given by P n
t = e−An−B′
nYt, where A0 = 0, B0 = 0N(L+1)×1, and for n ≥ 0,
An+1 = δ0 + An + (Φ
Q
0 )
′Bn, Bn+1 = δ1 + (Φ
Q)
′Bn.
It follows that the zero-coupon bond yields are given by
r
n
t = an + b
′
nYt,
where an ≡ An/n and bn ≡ Bn/n.
B Kalman Filter and Likelihood Function
In this section, we collect all of the assumptions and analytical results for constructing
the Kalman Filter and the likelihood function.
Suppose that we include K bonds in the estimation, with maturities nk, k =












where zt is equal to yt excluding any latent variables. Let’s assume that, out of N
state variables, M are observed. Without loss of generality, we assume that yt is
ordered in such a way that all latent variables follow the observed variables. Then
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.
As part of the econometric speciﬁcation, we assume that the ”measurement errors”
vt are i.i.d., multi-variate normal, with zero mean and covariance matrix R. In
addition, we assume that the observed state variables do not contain measurement
errors, so that the last M elements of the K + M vector vt are identically zero, and
R is identically zero except the upper-left K × K sub-matrix, which represents the
covariance matrix of the measurement errors in the observed yields.21
Let It = (Xs : s ≤ t) be the current information set, and let
ˆ Yt+1|t ≡ E (Yt+1|It), Pt+1|t ≡ E
 




be the optimal forecast of the state vector and the associated mean square forecast
errors (MSE). The Kalman-Filter algorithm allows us to compute the forecasts and
the associated MSE recursively as follows:


















starting with the unconditional mean and covariance matrix ˆ Y1|0 = E (Yt) and P1|0 =
cov (Yt). Under our VAR speciﬁcation, the unconditional covariance matrix is given
by vec(P1|0) = [I − Φ ⊗ Φ]
−1 × vec(Ω).
20For the Kalman Filter, we will follow closely the notation and algorithms developed in Time
Series Analysis by James D. Hamilton. Accordingly, we set, without loss of generality, φ0 = 0 and
therefore Φ0 = 0 by taking out the unconditional (or sample) means of the state variables througout
the paper.
21In principle, we can allow the observed state variables zt to contain measurement errors, in
which case the matrix R has full rank.
24The likelihood function can be constructed by noting that, given the informa-









, t ≥ 0.
All of the parameters (Φ,Ω,G,H,R) that determine the behavior of the Kalman
Filter are completely determined by the primitive parameters β ≡ (φj,j = 0,1,...,L+
1,ω,δ0,δ,λ0,λ) through deterministic transformations and the no-arbitrage pricing
restrictions. In particular, the no-arbitrage pricing restrictions are encapsulated in
the vector G and matrix H, which are completely determined by the yield loadings.
22By convention, I0 means no information and therefore X1 is drawn from the unconditional
distribution.
25Table 1: Summary Statistics. Sample Period is 1970:1 to 2003:3
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1-quarter nominal rate 135 0.0632 0.0291 0.00678 0.154
2-year nominal rate 135 0.0709 0.0273 0.0132 0.158
5-year nominal rate 135 0.0753 0.0246 0.0255 0.152
10-year nominal rate 135 0.0784 0.0226 0.0381 0.150
Federal Fund Rate 135 0.0667 0.0313 0.0100 0.175
Log(Spending/Taxes) 135 0.281 0.121 0.0141 0.551
Detrended Real Taxes 135 0 0.0339 -0.0583 0.0724
Detrended Real Spending 135 0 0.114 -0.275 0.264
Inﬂation 135 0.0409 0.0259 0.00782 0.122
Help Wanted Index 135 0.0763 0.0172 0.0370 0.105
2
6Table 2: Yield Regressions
Maturity 2-year 5-year 10-year 10-year 10-year 10-year
Federal Fund Rate 0.861 0.752 0.669 0.665 0.661 -0.144
0.032 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.044 0.039
Log(Spending/Taxes)/10 0.319 0.56 0.681 0.38
0.067 0.071 0.07 0.034
Inﬂation -0.044 -0.048 -0.056 -0.088 -0.104 -0.015
0.039 0.041 0.041 0.049 0.053 0.018
∆ Help Wanted Index 0.602 0.56 0.444 0.342 0.666 -0.124
0.175 0.187 0.185 0.187 0.24 0.087
Detrended Real Taxes -0.706
0.074




# of Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135
R2 0.893 0.85 0.826 0.829 0.7 0.965
Notes: Standard errors are under regression coeﬃcients. Sample period: 1970:1 to 2003:3
2
7Table 3: One Year Excess Return Regressions
Maturity 2-year 5-year 10-year 10-year 10-year 10-year
Federal Fund Rate 0.146 0.27 0.458 0.559 0.583 -4.479
0.067 0.216 0.417 0.421 0.419 0.925
Log(Spending/Taxes)/10 0.421 1.152 1.989 1.787 1.285 -0.101
0.137 0.44 0.848 0.856 0.897 0.836
Inﬂation -0.328 -1.022 -1.979 -1.808 -1.558 -1.759
0.079 0.253 0.489 0.545 0.551 0.437
Change in Help Wanted Index -1.29 -3.142 -5.008 -8.22
0.357 1.15 2.218 2.05
Growth Rate of GDP -0.747
1.208




# of Observations 131 131 131 130 131 131
R2 0.236 0.204 0.191 0.168 0.173 0.364
Notes: Standard errors are under regression coeﬃcients. Sample period: 1970:1 to 2003:3
2
8Table 4: MLE Estimates
rt = 1.5812% +



































−0.449 0.048 0.200 1.441 0.092
−0.077 −0.202 0.039 −0.392 0.169
0.495 −0.841 −0.869 −0.396 0.184
−0.222 0.141 0.270 0.705 −0.414










0.163 −0.147 0.148 −0.874 −0.027
0.032 0.281 0.009 0.433 −0.154
−0.030 0.017 0.234 −0.488 0.001
0.034 0.167 0.028 −0.288 0.228








   

0.530 0.005 0.058 1.296 0.352
−0.022 0.686 −0.003 −0.477 0.180
0.170 −0.071 0.631 0.384 −0.303
−0.126 −0.141 0.015 1.355 −0.090
0.055 0.028 −0.051 −0.131 0.463





   

0.163 −0.147 0.148 −0.874 −0.027
0.032 0.281 0.009 0.433 −0.154
−0.030 0.017 0.234 −0.488 0.001
0.034 0.167 0.028 −0.288 0.228
0.060 0.035 0.086 0.015 0.179









2.230 −0.195 0.139 0.175  
−0.131 0.657 −0.184 −0.209  
0.306 −0.353 2.155 −0.031  
0.121 −0.124 −0.059 0.668  









    
   

Q 1 2 4 8 16 20 30 40
1 47.165 0.849 0.304 −0.411 −0.838 −0.766 −0.550 −0.406
2 27.933 17.394 0.701 −0.121 −0.933 −0.944 −0.771 −0.626
4 7.263 19.998 10.854 0.567 −0.582 −0.806 −0.880 −0.825
8 −7.317 7.687 12.962 6.021 0.298 −0.080 −0.481 −0.600
16 −13.421 −6.733 0.867 4.554 3.122 0.917 0.622 0.443
20 −13.823 −10.028 −4.300 1.009 3.597 1.282 0.878 0.753
30 −13.640 −14.261 −12.588 −6.497 2.679 3.304 2.581 0.971
40 −12.902 −16.932 −17.893 −11.975 2.695 7.245 5.379 2.248

  
    
   

(bp)
Parameters that are ﬁxed to 0 are represented by a “ ”. The lower triangle of the volatility matrix for yt
contains the Cholesky decomposition of its conditional covariance matrix and the upper triangle contains the
correlation matrix (which is not scaled by 10−2). Similarly, the lower triangle of R represents the Cholesky




rt =   +



































−3.596 0.306 1.801 3.416 0.789
−2.233 −2.141 1.037 −3.356 1.544
1.108 −1.294 −2.401 −0.491 0.481
−1.182 0.434 1.453 2.233 −1.526










      −1.990  
  5.873   3.903 −1.434
    1.732 −1.226  
      −2.867 1.631








   

5.445   0.603 2.994  
  14.367   −4.298 1.671
2.138   5.556 0.965 −1.768
−4.887   0.691 13.505 −0.673
1.784   −1.063 −2.098 5.883





   

      −1.990  
  5.873   3.903 −1.434
    1.732 −1.226  
      −2.867 1.631
    1.794    









10.263 −12.817 11.920 13.055  
  12.330 −1.345 −1.610  
  −1.142 11.339 −0.903  
  −1.294   12.963  









    
   

Q 1 2 4 8 16 20 30 40
1 9.589 23.713 6.263 −7.314 −43.835 −12.416 −8.174 −6.640
2 13.389 7.535 16.265 −0.730 −71.397 −30.189 −6.955 −4.255
4   4.512 5.298 3.707 −17.814 −20.232 −13.409 −7.640
8   1.575 4.487 5.227 2.196 −0.477 −3.847 −5.506
16 −14.424     5.852 19.126 34.377 6.480 3.543
20 −13.097 −3.471 −1.914   14.654 15.679 24.335 11.257
30 −14.685 −2.096 −2.125 −3.699       116.015
40   −1.582 −1.935 −3.619   12.465 7.338  

  
    
   

logL = −59.28344
Fixed parameters are represetned by a “ ”. Some of these parameters are ﬁxed as a normalization, and some
are ﬁxed to their MLE point estimates because their t-ratios are relatively small even if they are free.
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0Figure 1: Yields Loadings



























Figure 2: Moments of Yields







































31Figure 3: Decomposition of Unconditional Yield Variance
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Figure 4: Campbell-Shiller
















































32Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to Deﬁcit Shock

















Figure 6: Yield Responses to Deﬁcit Shock














10−Year Rate under EH
33Figure 7: Response of 10-Year

















































Figure 8: Response of 10-Year Risk Premium


































































34Figure 9: Variance Decomposition for Priced Factors



































































Figure 10: Variance Decomposition for Yields


































































35Figure 11: Impulse Responses to Spending Shock
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Figure 12: Impulse Responses to Tax Shock
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36Figure 13: Yield Responses to Spending Shock
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Figure 14: Yield Responses to Tax Shock
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